Introduction

The ongoing aggression and blockade imposed on Gaza have had severe consequences on its infrastructure, leading to increased poverty, unemployment, and food insecurity. This deterioration in economic conditions has driven tens of thousands of young people to emigrate in search of better livelihoods, often facing the dangers of refugee journeys. Following the brutal military assault by the occupation on Gaza on October 7, 2023—an assault that the International Court of Justice indicated could constitute genocide given the evidence suggesting the potential for acts of extermination by the occupying state—many Palestinian families felt compelled to leave Gaza for Egypt. This decision was driven by the extreme violence that resulted in the annihilation of entire residential areas, the erasure of entire families from civil records, and the destruction of infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, universities, places of worship, and public institutions, leaving no safe place in Gaza. This migration was a quest for safety, aligned with the fundamental right to life and the instinct for survival.

The Israeli army issued military orders through text messages, leaflets, and announcements on Facebook, instructing residents from northern Gaza and Gaza City to move southward, claiming that humanitarian safe zones were available, particularly in the areas of Mawasi Khan Younis and Rafah. UNRWA and the Red Cross responded to these orders by closing their headquarters in Gaza and relocating to Rafah, which created a state of confusion and forced hundreds of thousands to flee southward in compliance with the military orders.

About the Author:

Mohsen Abu Ramadan: Writer and political analyst. Specialist in development and civil society issues. Director of Dr. Haidar Abdel Shafi Center for Culture and Development in Gaza.

This paper examines the reasons behind the Gazans' migration from Gaza to Egypt, the challenges they faced upon migrating, potential solutions to address these challenges, and provides conclusions and recommendations regarding this new phenomenon.

The Overcrowding of Refugees in Rafah

The intense bombing, combined with the ground incursion and the atrocities committed against civilians—including arrests, mistreatment of prisoners, cold-blooded killings, comprehensive destruction, and the bombing of homes with residents inside—along with the army’s threats, drove civilians to seek refuge in Rafah. The occupation claimed it was a humanitarian safe zone, especially after the military warned residents of Khan Younis and its displaced population to leave for Rafah before carrying out an incursion that resulted in hundreds of casualties, widespread destruction of homes and infrastructure, and extensive damage to hospitals and institutions.

Approximately 1.3 million people crowded into an area of just 25 square kilometers in Rafah, located along the border with Egypt, making it the largest displacement camp in the world. Citizens’ suffering worsened due to restrictions on the entry of food, water shortages, and a lack of medicine and medical supplies.

Alongside this humanitarian crisis, social and economic issues emerged, including price increases due to war profiteering, rising familial and social conflicts, and the initial lack of coordinated community and grassroots efforts to consolidate relief efforts and bolster social unity. Although these initiatives gradually increased in intensity and effectiveness—particularly by non-governmental and civil society organizations—the crisis continued to impact the displaced population severely.

The occupying state imposed strict restrictions on the entry of food and medical aid, and instead of applying pressure on it, the U.S. resorted to airdropping supplies. Nevertheless, gatherings of civilians were targeted, resulting in massacres at Al-Nablusi Roundabout on Al-Rashid Street along the coastline in Sheikh Ajlin and the Kuwaiti Hospital Roundabout on Salah Al-Din Street, located centrally between Gaza City and the central region, near Shuja'iyya and the rebuilt Netzarim settlement.

With no progress in ceasefire negotiations or a prisoner exchange deal due to Israeli intransigence, the lack of U.S. pressure, and the continued destruction of life-sustaining infrastructure, coupled with reduced access to humanitarian aid, the number of families considering emigration to Egypt—Gaza's sole gateway to the outside world—increased. The occupying state controls all other border crossings and imposes strict restrictions on the movement of goods and people.

Means of Exit from Gaza

Before the aggression began, Hamas supervised the Rafah border crossing on the Palestinian side, while the Egyptian state managed the Egyptian side. Names were also sent to Israel, according to a 2005 agreement, for approval. The presence of a European Union monitoring force, as stipulated in the 2005 agreement, had become irrelevant following the redeployment of the Israeli army in Gaza and subsequent events that negated Israel’s insistence on controlling the Rafah crossing. This came in the context of an economic peace policy aimed at easing living conditions, potentially to encourage citizens to leave Gaza in a less complicated manner and alleviate the densely populated area.

Various means of exiting Gaza emerged after October 7, some involving contacts with influential circles within the Egyptian state, which facilitated the exit for some individuals, particularly those with connections to political forces, the private sector, and civil society organizations, as well as those with personal or friendly ties to senior Egyptian officials overseeing the reconciliation file and the conflict with Israel. Other arrangements were facilitated through the Egyptian Foreign Ministry via official Palestinian Authority channels in Ramallah, which coordinated for certain names.

The "Hala" company for consulting and travel services, a private entity established through a partnership between the private sector and the state, became operational and facilitated the exit of a large number of families. This company offered VIP services for travel from Gaza to Egypt and vice versa, with costs averaging $750 per person, subject to supply and demand. Many citizens seeking travel, particularly those with means, resorted to the company due to severe overcrowding and long wait times.

Some individuals and families with foreign passports or residency permits had their embassies in Egypt facilitate their exit in coordination with the authorities overseeing the crossing.

Some also turned to social media to raise funds through platforms like GoFundMe, among other similar means, inviting donors to contribute towards the travel costs of individuals seeking to escape Gaza’s devastating conditions. However, technical requirements, such as having a bank account in the U.S., were necessary for using this method. This avenue saw some success until the occupying state coordinated with U.S. authorities to impose restrictions on banks and donations, limiting its effectiveness. Consequently, diverse migration methods developed, with forced migration numbers exceeding 100,000 people.

Finally, due to the increasing demand for exit amid ongoing aggression, Hala company announced its readiness to accept applications at a fee of $5,000 per person. Many families registered through relatives in Egypt, with exit procedures completed following payment. As a result, the majority of travelers used Hala's services.

The Situation of Gazans After Migration to Egypt

The initial waves of refugees arriving in Egypt due to the aggression showed marked economic and social variation. Most early refugees shared similar economic backgrounds, including businesspeople, private sector employees, civil society organization workers, and banking and financial sector employees, along with some political leaders. This composition reflects a level of influence and financial capability, along with economic and social connections with Egyptian leadership circles.

However, as the severity of the bombing and acts of genocide increased, along with the growing aggression of the Israeli army, migration expanded to include broader segments of the population, especially from southern Gaza’s camps, where the roads between Gaza and its northern regions were cut off and between the central and southern areas after the Netzarim settlement was rebuilt.

Many Gaza residents began contemplating selling personal possessions, such as family jewelry or cars, to cover travel costs or raise funds via platforms like GoFundMe. This economic and social disparity among Gazans who fled to Egypt was stark; some poorer individuals sought aid from the Palestinian embassy in Cairo and charitable organizations for basic necessities like food, clothing, shelter, or assistance to pay university tuition for their children. Meanwhile, wealthier private sector and civil society representatives played a different role, working to influence political and economic situations to expedite aid delivery to Palestinians in Gaza and to those in need in Egypt.

The Palestinian embassy functioned as a liaison between charitable organizations, both Arab and foreign, that sought to deliver assistance to Gazans in Egypt through coordinated efforts and registration lists. The Palestinian embassy in Cairo estimated the number of Gazans who migrated to Egypt at approximately 120,000 people